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The paper analyses the economic and political history of the Ross Sea, where exploration, science, commercial exploitation, politics and adventure became highly interlinked and interwoven. Expedition accounts and the extensive literature on Antarctic history and politics inform the contextual aspects. The archives of the Norwegian whaling company A/S Rosshavet, established in 1923, and the United States of America and New Zealand archival material from the 1950s are key sources. From the first whaling season onwards, the impact of Antarctic whaling, and later scientific bases, highlights and illustrates the tensions between Antarctic commerce, territorial claims and international politics.

Signed in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty is usually hailed as an example of what states can achieve when they leave aside their interests and truly collaborate. It was over 30?years ago, however, that the last significant legal instrument of the Antarctic Treaty System (namely, the Protocol on Environmental Protection) was signed. Since then, no new legal instruments have been drafted, despite a number of growing internal and external challenges. In this special issue, an interdisciplinary group of scholars examine some of these challenges and evaluate whether the system is well prepared to tackle them. Their point of agreement is that, if not severely ill, the system's chronic ailments?particularly laggardness?must be addressed if it is to respond satisfactorily to rapid social, political, environmental and economic changes on a global scale.

While Argentine-Chilean relations have long been swayed between cooperation and confrontation since their independence in the 19th century and a long-standing presence in Antarctica, the stretch between Tierra del Fuego to the Antarctic Peninsula stands as the closest lane (i.e. about 1,000 km) to any other continent. Despite their territorial dispute over islands on the fractured southern tip of South America and territorial claims on the Antarctic, their common diplo-matic ground successfully defuses any potential geopolitical instability. Along with Chile and Argentina, British claims overlap in the Antarctic Peninsula, which establishes unique geopolitical conditions in the whole of Antarctica. In this context, scientific missions and growing tourist activities could transform the region into the Antarctic gateway. From potential mineral resources exploitation to the United States- China global competition, the South Atlantic area could become a strategic bridgehead in light of the brewing geopolitical shift during the 21st century. Considering that climate change and geostrategic conditions evolve somewhat quickly to transform the Western Antarctic area, this article aims to assess and comprehend how these external drivers may affect the two South American countries. Given the fact that Antarctica is part of their respective national narrative, how do Argentina and Chile intend to maintain their presence and protect their interest in these shifting conditions? What are the vectors for partnering with the world’s great powers, such as China? Ultimately, could this space become a choke point through the 21st century?

Argentina and Chile, known in the world of Antarctic politics as the 'South American claimants', have shown themselves since the inception of their interests in the White Continent as standing alone and in opposition to the advances of the colonial powers of the North - especially the United Kingdom. As Shirley Scott has suggested, while the UK was busy staking claims over Antarctica and treating it as terra nullius, Argentina and Chile ascertained what they took to be their historical rights to the continent, inherited from the time when they were Spanish colonies. In this article, I support Argentina's and Chile's contention that the attitude and procedure followed by the other claimants to the continent was unequivocally colonial, but I reject their contention that theirs was not. I examine four sites where their colonial spirit is revealed: their use of the geographic doctrines of continuity and contiguity, and of the sector principle; the appeal to historic rights inherited from the time when they were Spanish colonies; their expansion to Antarctica through the establishment of military settlements, and their underlying economic and strategic interests, no different from their 'Northern' counterparts. I then point to some specific and general implications of reinterpreting their story in this light.

Global pressure over Antarctic resources will mount in the course of the coming decades. Three factors are likely to motivate states to claim jurisdictional rights or rights to natural resources in Antarctica: climate change, dwindling natural resources in the rest of the world, and the fact that – by virtue of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty – the question of sovereignty remains unresolved. It is high time to think about the moral dimensions that should shape Antarctic claims in the future. Is there any state or group of states more entitled than others to make such claims? What does sound management of natural resources require? How should environmental concerns factor into decisions about jurisdictional control and appropriation of natural resources? With these broad questions in the background, in this article I examine four principles of justice that figure prominently in current theories of territorial rights and rights over natural resources in political philosophy: connection, capacity, fair distribution, and need. I show how these principles have been used by states, alone or in tandem, to justify claims to jurisdiction and claims to natural resources in Antarctica. After pointing to their main strengths and weaknesses, I suggest that they may be necessary, but insufficient to build a just framework for jurisdiction and appropriation of resources in the White Continent.

There are at least four ways in which Antarctic colonialism was white: it was paradigmatically performed by white men; it consisted in the taking of vast, white expanses of land; it was carried out with a carte blanche (literally, “blank card”) attitude; and it was presented to the world as a white, innocent adventure. While the first, racial whiteness has been amply problematised, I suggest that the last three illuminate yet other moral wrongs of the Antarctic colonial project. Moreover, they might be constitutive of a larger class of “white” colonialisms beyond the White Continent.

By virtue of the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, the territorial claims to Antarctica of seven of the original signatories were held in abeyance or “frozen.” Considered by many as an exemplar of international law, the Antarctic Treaty System has come to be increasingly questioned, however, in a very much changed global scenario that presents new challenges to the governance of the White Continent. In this context, it is necessary to gain a clearer understanding of the moral weight of those initial claims, which stand (despite being frozen) as a cornerstone of the treaty. The aim of this article is to offer an appraisal of such claims, which may be divided into two main kinds: those grounded on some relevant link to the territory, and those grounded on official documents and geographical doctrines. After pointing to the limitations and challenges that they face, I conclude with some remarks about how this assessment ought to serve as a starting point to rethink the territorial status of Antarctica.

The introduction of non-native species to Antarctica in association with human activities is a major threat to indigenous biodiversity and the region's unique ecosystems, as has been well-demonstrated in other ecosystems globally. Existing legislation contained in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty does not specifically make the eradication of non-native species mandatory, although it is implicit that human-assisted introductions should not take place. Furthermore, to date, eradications of non-native species in the Treaty area have been infrequent and slow to progress. In 2005 an additional Annex (VI) to the Protocol was agreed concerning “Liability arising from environmental emergencies.” This annex focusses on prevention of environmental emergencies, contingency planning and reclaiming costs incurred when responding to an environmental emergency caused by another operator within the Antarctic Treaty area. However, the types of environmental emergencies covered by the annex are not defined. In this paper we highlight potential difficulties with the application of Annex VI in the context of non-native species control and eradication, including, for example, whether a non-native species introduction would be classified as an “environmental emergency” and therefore be considered under the terms of the annex. Even if this were the case, we conclude that the slow pace of approval of the annex by Antarctic Treaty Parties may prevent it coming into force for many years and, once in force, in its current form it is unlikely to be useful for reclaiming costs associated with the eradication or management of a non-native species.

Within the polar science community the Polar (and Geophysical) Years represent signal events. We often read, largely within geoscience literature, that those events represented positive and dramatic steps forward in international science. From five recent books - two historical compilations and three personal narratives - augmented by interviews with a few key participants, a more cautious picture emerges, of remarkable successes but also of occasional or even persistent missteps and deficiencies. An improved understanding of the IPY concept and experience can provide useful guidance for future polar and global science. Keywords: International Polar Year; International Geophysical Year; international science; history of polar science.

For over 50 years the Antarctic has been governed through the Antarctic Treaty, an international agreement now between 49 nations of whom 28 Consultative Parties (CPs) undertake the management role. Ostensibly, these Parties have qualified for their position on scientific grounds, though diplomacy also plays a major role. This paper uses counts of policy papers and science publications to assess the political and scientific outputs of all CPs over the last 18 years. We show that a subset of the original 12 Treaty signatories, consisting of the seven claimant nations, the USA and Russia, not only set the political agenda for the continent but also provide most of the science, with those CPs producing the most science generally having the greatest political influence. None of the later signatories to the Treaty appear to play a major role in managing Antarctica compared with this group, with half of all CPs collectively producing only 7% of the policy papers. Although acceptance as a CP requires demonstration of a substantial scientific programme, the Treaty has no formal mechanism to review whether a CP continues to meet this criterion. As a first step to addressing this deficiency, we encourage the CPs collectively to resolve to hold regular international peer reviews of their individual science programmes and to make the results available to the other CPs. Keywords: Governance; claimant states; Antarctic policy; scientific publications.

Commemorating a particular anniversary is always an arbitrary affair, an act of whimsy. After all, why acknowledge the 50th anniversary of someone or some event as opposed to the 48th? In terms of birthdays, we tend to celebrate each year as another rite of human passage. However, when it comes to events such as wars and diplomatic encounters, the media and political commentators like more substantial blocks of time: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 100th anniversaries are particularly noteworthy. The year 2009 has proven no different in terms of representing a temporal marker for the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. In December 2009 a so-called Antarctic Treaty Summit was held in Washington, D.C. to take advantage of not only such a milestone, but also “to highlight lessons learned about international governance ‘with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind’ ” (Antarctic Treaty Summit 2009, emphasis added).